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FEDERAL JURISDICTION TO RESTRAIN COLLECTION OF STATE TX
IN two recent cases, Matthews v. Rodgers 1 and Strattom 'v. St. Lozds South-
western Ry.,2 the Supreme Court has shown an appreciation of the delicacy
of the adjustment between state and federal power, denying equity juris-
diction for injunctive relief from alleged unconstitutional taxes on the
ground that the legal remedy was adequate.3
The adequacy of legal relief is questionable, for although statutes have
generally provided machinery for contesting such taxes by permitting
suits for recovery after payment,4 the burden of delay incident to the liti-
gation rests upon the taxpayer. Thus equitable relief has been considered
appropriate where the taxpayer would otherwise risk loss of interim
interest,P or where payment would so reduce his assets as to bring about
insolvency,6 or where lack of financial responsibility in the tax official
might make recovery useless 7 The legal remedy has similarly been held
inadequate where a tax with varied incidence has been assessed upon a
centralized agencyp or where the proceeds would have been distributed
among a number of taxing units,' since recovery in either case would re-
quire multiplicity of action. Even in the absence of apparent equitable
considerations, the possibility of the subsequent failure of legislative ma-
chinery to cover the specific case should induce equity courts not to decline
jurisdiction.-0 In the instant cases, since state statutes provided for in-
' U. S. Daily, Feb. 17, 1932, at 2850.
' U. S. Daily, Feb. 17, 1932, at 2851. The Stratton case has been in
the courts since 1927, argued four times in the Supreme Court, and has yet
to be decided on its merits.
- 36 STAT. 1163 (1911), 28 U. S. C. § 384 (1926) : "Suits in equity -hall
not be sustained in any court of the United States in any case where a
plain, adequate, and complete remedy may be had at law." The remedy
must be adequate in a federal court. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R.
v. Osborne, 265 U. S. 14, 44 Sup. Ct. 431 (1924). See (1928) 37 Y.UL
L. J. 378.
4 See, e.g., N. Y. CONS. LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 61, 296; Oio GEN. CODE
(Page, 1931) § 12075. See Field, Recovery of Illegal and Unconstititioaal
Taxes (1932) 45 HARV. L. REV. 501, 506.
5 Proctor & Gamble Distributing Co. v. Sherman, 2 F. (2d) 105 (S. D.
N. Y. 1924); cf. Hopkins v. Southern California Tel. Co., 275 U. S. 393,
48 Sup. Ct. 180 (1928).
I Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U. S. 20, 28 Sup. Ct. 7
(1907).
7 See Arkansas Building & Loan Ass'n v. Madden, 173 U. S. 269, 274,
20 Sup. Ct. 119, 121 (1899).
8 Cummings v. National Bank, 101 U. S. 153 (1879) (corporation to
pay tax for shareholders); Travis v. Yale & Towne Al'fg Co., 252 U. S. 60,
40 Sup. Ct. 228 (1920) (employer to pay tax for employees).
9 Chicago, Great Western Ry. v. Kendall, 266 U. S. 94, 45 Sup. CL 55
(1924).
10 Cf. Spring Valley Coal Co. -. State, 198 Ind. 620, 154 N. E. 080 (1926)
(state court found statute inapplicable after federal injunction denied);
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U. S. 673, 50 Sup. Ct.
451 (1930) (state action barred by statute of limitations). See Field,
op. cit. supra- note 4, at 504.
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junctions in the state courts,"' equitable relief was not precluded, but whore
no such remedy is available within the state, a like result would seem un-
fortunate.
The refusal to entertain jurisdiction is justifiable, however, by the unde-
sirability of anticipatory federal interference with state legislation.12 The
political issue involved in the determination of a conflict of national policy
with local state views is present in limine.'s In addition, however, a de-
cision on the merits involves not only the Federal Constitution, but an
interpretation of state law and an analysis of the local situation to which
it is to be applied.14 In dealing with these latter issues, the federal court
is at a distinct disadvantage, and since its conclusion thereon is without
force in the state, an unfortunate conflict of interpretation might well
ensue.' 5 The only positive limitation on the power of federal intervention is
the requirement of final state legislative process, 16 but additional restric-
tions have at times been self-imposed. Thus in public utility rate cases,
where extremely complex questions of state law must be determined prior
to the constitutional issues, the Supreme Court has definitely indicated its
unwillingness to interfere until the state courts have disposed of these
questions.17 The local problems incident to other legislation differ only in
the degree of their complexity, and the decision in the instant cases indi-
cates a desirable extension of the policy of non-interference. That the
court was in fact influenced more by this consideration than by the ade-
quacy of legal relief is suggested by its decision on the same day in Miller
v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,18 where an injunction against a federal
tax was allowed in the face of express statutory prohibition.D
23 Miss. ANN. CODE (1930) § 420; ILL. Rnv. -STAT. (Smith-Hurd, 1931)
c. 127, § 172. It has been suggested that § 267 of the Judicial Code be
amended to bar equity jurisdiction where the state has provided adequate
remedy. Cf. note 3, supra.
12 See Lockwood, Maw and Rosenberry, The Use of the Fcdral Injunc-
tion inV Constitutional Litigation (1930) 43 HAaV. L. REy. 426, 450. From
the point of view of the litigants, if a state injunction is available, the
possibility of direct appeal to the Supreme Court offers the only technical
advantage in the choice of a federal forum.
13 See Lawrence v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 274 1. S. 588, 595, 47
Sup. Ct. 720, 723 (1927); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference
(1930) 43 HARv. L. REV. 345. Since a federal action to recover taxes paid
does not involve the use of an injunction, it is not open to the same objec-
tion.
14 See Pogue, State Determination of State Law and the Judicial Code
(1928) 41 HARv. L. Ray. 623, 632.
is See Southern Ry. v. Watts, 260 U. S. 519, 522, 43 Sup. Ct. 192, 194
(1923).
26 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 29 Sup. Ct. 67
(1908). Section 266 of the Judicial Code permits suspension of prior
federal action by state proceedings, but states have generally failed to
set up a workable mechanism to take advantage of the provision. See Pogue,
op. cit. supra note 14.
17 Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159, 49 Sup. Ct.
282 (1929). See Lillienthal, The Federal Courts and State Regulation of
Public Utilities (1930) 43 HARv. L. R.y. 379.
1s U. S. Daily, Feb. 18, 1932, at 2860.
19 14 STAT. 475 (1867), 26 U. S. § 154 (1926): "No suit for the purpose




PERSONS ENTITLED TO CHALLENGE A DEVISE OR BEQUrST INVALID UNDER A
CHARITABLE STATUTE
STATUTES in several states qualify the power of a testator to dispose of
more than a certain proportion of his estate to charitable purposes in the
event of his being survived either by a dependent or other near relativej
The issue as to who may challenge a testamentary gift invalid under such
a statute seems to depend rather on judicial interpretation of the purpose
of the statute than on differing phraseology. It is usually assumed that
the statutes were designed primarily, if not solely, for the benefit of those
relatives upon whose survival the prohibition depends, and the prevailing
rule seems to be that only such relatives may raise the issue of invalidity2
New York, however, has announced a different conception of the purpose
behind its statute. In the early case of Harris v. Bible Society,3 the Court
of Appeals, in holding that a sister of the testator, who was not a party
mentioned in the statute, might properly contest an invalid gift although
the testator's wife had consented thereto, gave countenance to a belief that
the Legislature intended the statutory prohibition as a mortmain policy,
under which a disposition in excess of the permitted amount was void
rather than voidable 4 and therefore subject to challenge by anyone who
would derive a benefit from its invalidity.5 Although this view was qualified
in a later ease6 -where it was held that those designated in the statute
together with the testator's ne t of kin might together "waive" its pro-
visions,7 more recent New York decisions have paid but scant heed to the
implications of this holding and have defined the category of eligible con-
' E.g. GA. CODE ANN. (Michie. 1926) § 3851 ("wife, child, or descendants
of child").; N. Y. DECEDENT ESTATE LAW (1930) § 17 ("husband, wife,
child or descendant or parent"); cf. D. C. CODE (1919) tit. 29 § 42 (sole
requirement that will be made one month before death); PA. STAT. ANN.
(Purdon, 1930) tit. 20, § 195 (one month and attestation by two "credible
and disinterested witnesses"). See statutes collected in Bordwell, Stat uo
Law of Wills (1929) 14 IOwA L. REv. 172, 996-997; WOERNER, Azma C.M
LAW OF ADMINISTRATION (3d ed. 1923) § 425.
Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 70 Ohio St. 92, 70 N. E. 890 (1904);
Folsom v. Board of Trustees, 210 Ill. 404, 71 N. E. 384 (1904); Monahan
v. O'Byrne, 147 Ga. 633, 95 S. E. 210 (1918). But cf. Patton v. Patton,
39 Ohio St. 590 (1883). Election to take under the will is, however, not
usually construed as a waiver of the statute. Trustees v. Denmark, 141
Ga. 390, 81 S. E. 238 (1914). But cf. Randeman v. Williams, 190 Iowa 538,
194 N. W. 964 (1923). And a waiver under the will has been held not
to affect the contestant's privilege to challenge an altered codicil. Re
Johnston's Estate, 197 Cal. 28, 239 Pac. 397 (1925); cf. In re Opdyhe's
Will, 230 App. Div. 290, 243 N. Y. Supp. 606 (4th Dep't 1930) [modified
on other grounds in 255 N. Y. 255, 174 N. E. 646 (1931)]. Furthermore,
a stipulation by the charity that the bequest is invalid is apparently binding
on the court despite a waiver by the statutory beneficiary. See In re
Noble's Estate, 194 Iowa 733, 740, 190 N. W. 511, 514 (1922).
32 Abb. Dec. 316 (1867), aff'g Harris v. Slaght, 46 Barb. 470 (N. Y.
1866).
4 Cf. In re Arnold's Estate, 249 Pa. 348, 356, 94 At. 1076, 1079 (1915);
dissent in Monahan v. O'Byrne, supra note 2, at 034, 95 S. E. at 210.
z Compare Fugman v. Teobald, 3 Ohio N. P. 65 (1895), with same case,
64 Ohio St. 473, 60 N. E. 606 (1901). See Patton v. Patton, sMpr- note 2,
at 596.
6 Trustees of Amherst College v. Ritch, 151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 70
(1897).
7 Strictly speaking, there was a release rather than a waiver in this
case, the court stressing the consideration received by the widow and next
of kin.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
testants alternately to include any one who would derive a benefit by the
failure of the statutory excess 8 or, more narrowly, to include only those
who would take such excess from the testator had he died intestate0
A new problem was presented in Matter of Smallma's Estate,10 where
the challenge was raised by a legatee whose legacy had been partially
abated by reason of inadequacy of assets. In previous cases, the con-
testant had been, although remotely related, at least the testator's next
of kin, and the charitable disposition had been of the residuary estate.
In the Smallman will, on the other hand, the gifts complained of wore
non-residuary, the residuary estate having been bequeathed to a relative.
The surrogate, after distinguishing the past cases on this difference in
facts, and after discarding the "intestacy rule" as dictum, quoted with
approval the early Harris decision and held that since the gift if invalid
would fall to the residuary legatee, who, however, under acknowledged prin-
ciples could take nothing until abated legacies had been made up,"1 the
plaintiff would derive sufficient benefit from the alleged invalidity to raise
the issue.
If the New York rule thus extended is based on a conception of the
statute as an act against mortmain,12 it seems hardly justified. The English
Mortmain acts 13 are not part of our common law and, with the possible
exception of two states, 4 have not been re-enacted in this country.'0 Fur-
s See Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, 185 N. Y. 485, '78 N. E.
359 (1906) (nephew, widow consenting); Decker v. Vreeland, 220 N. Y.
326, 115 N. E. 989 (1917) (brother-in-law and nephew); of. Rich v. Tiffany,
2 App. Div. 25, 37 N. Y. Supp. 330 (4th Dep't 1896) (Ritch rule spoken
of as dictum). But of. Allen v. Stevens, 161 N. Y. 122, 55 N. 19. 68
(1899); Frazier v. Hoguet, 65 App. Div. 192, 72 N. Y. Supp. 840 (1st
Dep't 1901), disapproved in In re Beer's Will, 85 App. Div. 132, 83 N. Y.
Supp. 67 (3d Dep't 1903). The contestant, however, must always prove
that the testator was survived by a relative designated in the statute. St.
John v. Andrews Institute for Girls, 117 App. Div. 698, 102 N. Y. Supp. 808
(1st Dep't 1907).
9 See Jones v. Kelly, 63 App. Div. 614, 72 N. Y. Sup p. 24 (1st Dop't
1901) (resulting trust of land for heirs at law), aff'd, 1'70 N. Y. 401,
63 N. E. 443 (1902); Moser v. Tallman, 114 App. Div. 850, 100 N. Y.
Supp. 231 (2d Dep't 1906) (cousin); cf. Fisher v. Lister, 130 Misc. 1,
223 N. Y. Supp. 321 (Sup. Ct. 1927) (contestant who would merely get
expectancy from declaration of invalidity may not challenge). Failure of
one designated in the statute to challenge during his life-time will not
preclude others from objecting. In re Sloat's Will, 253 N. Y. Supp. 215
(Sur. Ct. 1931). Perhaps one who waits until his expectancy has matured
into a vested interest may thus find recognition under this rule. Compare
Fisher v. Lister, supra, with In re Tone's Estate, 103 Misc. 618, 170 N. Y.
Supp. 844 (Sur. Ct. 1918), aff'd, 226 N. Y. 696, 125 N. E. 926 (1019).
10 253 N. Y. Supp. 628 (Sur. Ct. 1931).
11 See discussion of this point in earlier proceedings in same case, 138
Misc. 889, 911-913, 247 N. Y. Supp. 597, 662-625. (Sur. Ct. 1930).
12Cf. McKeown v. Officer, 53 Hun 634, 6 N. Y. Supp. 201, 204 (2d
Dep't 1889). But cf. Monahan v. O'Byrne, supra note 2, at 633, 95 S. E. at
210; Re Dywer's Estate, 159 Cal. 680, 687, 115 Pac. 242, 245 (1911).
13 See (1929) 73 SOL. J. 83; 1 JARMiAN, WILLS (7th ed. 1930) 237-246.
14 MIss. CONST. 1890 § 269; Miss. CODE ANx. (1930) §§ 3564, 3565;
MD. DECL. RTS. (1867) art. 38.
Is See Re Dwyer's Estate, supra, note 12, at 686-690, 115 Pac. 244-246.
More analogous to acts against mortmain are statutory and charter pro-
visions in certain states limiting the right of charitable corporations to hold
real estate. See ZOLLAIAN, AMERIcAN LAw OF CIIARITIES (1924) §§
496-503. As to who may challenge a devise invalid under such provisions,
compare Jones v. Habersham, 107 U. S. 174, 2 Sup. Ct. 336 (1883) (only
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thermore, the Mortmain acts operate upon the capacity of a charity to
take, whereas even in New York it is conceded that the statutory prohi-
bition operates upon the power of a testator to give.O Again such statutes
specifically include personal as well as real estate, whereas acts against
mortmain were directed primarily against the holding of realty.27 Finally,
the policies responsible for the acts of mortmain 19 have not found recogni-
tion in this country.'9
On the other hand, the view that these statutes were designed to compel
the testator to provide for his relatives-20 seems questionable, for the tes-
tator may still donate all his property to charity during his lifetime, even
though the gift be made in contemplation of and within a few hours of
death 21 and in an effort to avoid the statute.22
The most plausible explanation seems to be that the prohibition is in-
tended to operate as a protection to those entitled to rely upon the tes-
tator's bounty from "the snares and contrivances" of those temptcd to
"prey upon the gullible and superstitious mind" of a testator in cxtroaz iS 3
a view substantiated by the fact that the prohibition is often made ex-
pressly contingent upon the will having been executed within a certain
time of the testator's death.2 4 Under this interpretation, the prevailing
rule that only those specified in the statute may raise the issue seems
well-founded, and in fact New York has recently amended its statute to
this effect, 2 thus apparently denying the substance of its earlier views.
Yet as against this limitation it will always be objected that it is prefer-
able to enlarge the category of potential contestants than to suffer the
possibility of a relative protected under the statute auctioning off his right
to challenge between the charity on the one hand and those who would
profit by a declaration of invalidity on the other.2
voidable by state), with In re McGraw's Estate, 111 N. Y. 66, 19 N. E. 233
(1888) (voidable by any one who would derive a benefit).
16 "The right [to dispose of property by will] is of a high order, not
to be denied or materially qualified except upon the clearest declaration of
the legislature to that effect." Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473, 481,
60 N. E. 606, 609 (1901). See Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 43 N. Y. 442,
440; cf. McKeown v. Officer, supra note 12, at 203. But cf. Harris v. Slaght,
supra note 3, at 505.
17 1 POLLOcK & MlAmTayaND, HISTORY OF ENGLISn LAW (1895) 314;
2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGrjSH LAW (3d ed. 1923) 69, 348-349; 3
ibid 86; 4 ibid. 443444.
s Ibid.
1I9 Cf. ZOLLrAN, op. cit. supra note 15, § 314; see Hubbard v. Worcester
Art Mluseum, 194 Mass. 280, 284, 80 N. E. 490, 491 (1907).
2 See Re Watkin's Estate, 118 Misc. 645, 648, 194 N. Y. Supp. 342, 346
(Sur. Ct. 1922); cf. Paschal v. Acklin, 27 Tex. 173 (1863).
21 See Robb v. Washington & Jefferson College, supra note 8, at 494,
78 N. E. at 362; Re Dwyer's Estate, supra note 12, at 686-687, 115 Pac.
at 244.
22 Cf. McGlade's Appeal, 99 Pa. 338 (1882) ; Thomas v. Board of Trus-
tees, mupra note 2, at 110-111, 70 N. E. at 899. See Allen v. Stevens, supra
note 8, holding statute inapplicable to testamentary trusts, modified in
Decker v. Vreeland, supra note 8.
23 See Reynolds v. Bristow, 37 Ga. 283, 288 (1867) ; Stephenson v. Short,
92 N. Y. 433, 441 (1883); of. Reimensnyder v. Gans, 110 Pa. 17, 20, 2 At].
425, 428 (1885).
24 See statutes cited supra note 1.
25N. Y. Laws 1929, c. 299, § 3, applying only to wills of persons dying
after August 31, 1930.
2r Cf. In re Beer's Will, sztp'a note 8, at 133-136, 83 N. Y. Supp. at 70.
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RESTRICTIVE PROVISIONS IN TRUST INDENTURES AmOUNTING TO OUSTER OF
JURISDICTION
IN First National Bank of Dallas 'v. Brown 1 holders of secured bonds which
were in default as to principal and interest instituted proceedings for
foreclosure and for dissolution of the corporation and the appointment
of a receiver. The mortgage indenture provided that the security held
thereunder should be enforced only by the trustee, that holders of bonds
due and unpaid might obtain a personal judgment against the corporation,2
and that if the trustee failed to act, the holders of 61% in amount of the
bonds should have the right to appoint a successor trustee. The Texas
Court of Civil Appeals affirmed an order for the appointment of a receiver,
holding that the provision giving the trustee exclusive power to enforce the
security was void as an ouster of the courts' jurisdiction.
So far as provisions in trust indentures restrict the rights of bond-
holders, or of the trustee acting in behalf of the bondholders, to exercise
remedies created solely by the indenture itself, they are given full effect
and no question of ouster can arise. Thus the trustee may be given the
exclusive right to exercise the power of entry 3 or to sell under a power of
sale.4 But wherever possible courts will construe the indenture to make
such restrictive remedies cumulative to the right of foreclosureA which is
said to be inherent in and essential to the very definition of a mortgage,
and therefore to be conditioned only by the most express language. Even
in the absence of any specific provision for foreclosure, the right is never-
theless held to exist upon lefault in payment.1 And a clause making It
the duty of the trustee to enforce the bondholder's rights after six months'
continued default will not deprive him of the right to foreclose immediately
upon non-payment.8 This reluctance to countenance restrictions on the
134 S. W. (2d) 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
2 Against the insolvent corporation, a personal judgment would be of little
value, since it could not be executed on mortgaged property. Common-
wealth v. Susquehanna & Delaware River R. R., 122 Pa. St. 306, 15 Atl.
448 (1888); Fleming v. Fairmont & Mannington R. R., 72 W. Va. 835,
79 S. E. 826 (1913).
SAlexander v. Central Railroad of Iowa, Fed. Cas. No. 166, at 363
(C. C. D. Iowa, 1874); see State Trust Co. v. Kansas City, Pittsburgh &
Gulf R. R., 120 Fed. 398, 406 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1903).
4 See Morgan's La. & Texas R. R. & Steamship Co. v. Texas Central Ry.,
137 U. S. 171, 11 Sup. Ct. 61 (1890); Toler v. East Tennessee, Virginia
& Georgia Ry., 67 Fed. 168, 179 (C. C. E. D. Tenn. 1894).
5 Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Chicago & Northern Pacific R. R., 61
Fed. 543 (C. C. N. D. Ill. 1894); Low v. Blackford, 87 Fed. 392 (C. C. A.
4th, 1898). Some mortgages provide that the prescribed remedies shall
be cumulative to foreclosure. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Winona &
Southwestern Ry., 59 Fed. 957 (C. C. D. Minn. 1893). As to indenture
provisions restricting the rights of individual bondholders to sue on ma-
tured bonds or interest coupons, see Note (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 312.
r Judicial sale follows from the nature of the security. Deck v. Whitman,
96 Fed. 873 (C. C. E. D. Tenn., 1899). And prior appointment of a receiver
does not preclude foreclosure. Van Frank v. St. Louis, Cape Girardeau &
Ft. Smith Ry., 93 Mo. App. 412, 67 S. W. 688 (1902).
7 Howell v. Western R. R., 94 U. S. 463 (1876). But if only the Interest
is due, foreclosure cannot be had for the principal. Chicago & Vincennes
R. R. v. Fosdick, 106 U. S. 47, 1 Sup. Ct. 10 (1882); Armour v. Waxa-
hachie Gas Co., 53 F. (2d) 979 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931). But of. Credit Co.
Ltd. of London, England v. Arkansas Central R. R., 15 Fed. 46 (C. C. E. D
Ark. 1882).
8 Mercantile Trust Co. v. Chicago Peoria & St. Louis Ry., 61 Fed, 372
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foreclosure right was particularly manifest in Guaranty Trust & Safe
Deposit Company v. Green Cove Springs & Melrose R. R.,O where it was
held that the trustees right to foreclose could not be completely cut off
and that consequently a provision prohibiting a judicial sale and making
a prescribed mode of liquidation exclusive was void as an ouster of juris-
diction. The instant holding, however, appears to give the doctrine of
ouster an even wider application in view of the fact that the present in-
denture confers upon the trustee an absolute right to proceed against the
security by judicial sale.'0 The court is apparently insisting upon some
residuum of direct control in the bondholder over the security, and in view
of the probable difficulty of securing concurrence of 51o of the bondholders
and of showing cause for the trustee's removal, the present indenture at
best affords only a highly tenuous and indirect form of control. Equally
effective ouster of jurisdiction might well result if the indenture required,
as a condition precedent to the right of bondholders to foreclose, the refusal
of the trustee to act upon demand of such a large percentage of the holders
as would probably render the procedure unavailing. What mamnum per-
centage the courts will sustain is a matter of conjecture. It is possible
that even so low a percentage requirement as a majority might be held
impracticable by reason of the present wide distribution of securities and
in fact there are dicta to that effect." But in the case of the common
indenture requiring a 25% request it is highly probable that the economic
advantages of preventing improvident action by a few bondholders will
always be given greater consideration than the theoretical or actual obstruc-
tion of the individual holder's right against the security.' 2
(C. C. S. D. Ill. 1893); see Central Trust Co. v. Worcester Cycle Dlanu-
facturing Co., 93 Fed. 712, 718 (C. C. A. 2d, 1899).
9 139 U. S. 137, 11 Sup. Ct. 512 (1891). This decision, the first to apply
the doctrine of ouster to bond indentures, relied largely on cases concerned
with agreements to refer to arbitration.
30 In Jones v. Atlantic & Western R. R., 193 N. C. 590, 137 S. E. 706
(1927), the court reached the opposite conclusion, holding that the exclusive
right in the trustee was sufficient. But see Southern National Bank v.
Germania Manufacturing Co., 176 N. C. 318, 319, 97 S. E. 1, 2 (1918).
In the principal case it does not appear whether foreclosure was also de-
creed. But since the restrictive provision was interpreted to apply to the
appointment of a receiver as well as to foreclosure, the issue as to ouster
remains the same.
" See Brown v. Denver Omnibus & Cab Co., 254 Fed. 560, 569 (C. C. A.
8th, 1918); cf. Lowenthal v. Georgia Coast & Piedmont R. R., 233 Fed.
1010, 1012 (S. D. Ga. 1916). Contra: Employers' Reinsurance Corp. v.
Boston Mutual Life Insurance Co., 45 F. (2d) 593 (C. C. A. 5th, 1930),
to the effect that refusal upon request by 50% of the bonds is a permissible
condition to the bondholder's right.
See Home Mortgage Co. v. Ramsey, 49 F. (2d) 738 (C. C. A. 4th,
1931) ; Seibert v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry., 52 Minn. 148, 53 N. W. 1134
(1893); cf. Stern v. Wisconsin Central R. R., Fed. Cas. No. 13,378, at 1310
(C. C. E. D. Wis. 1879). In Reinhardt v. Interstate Telephone Co., 71
N. J. Eq. 70, 63 AtI. 1097 (1906), the court looked upon a bondholder's
petition as one for the appointment of a statutory receiver of an insolvent
corporation and not a receiver of mortgaged premises. Consequently, it
was held the petitioner, as a creditor, was entitled to the relief sought
regardless of the provisions of the indenture.
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PROVABILITY IN BANKRUPTCY OF CLAIMS UNDER WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
LAWS
IN the recent case of In re Auerbach,' four claims, based on personal in-
juries received by employees of a bankrupt employer in the course of their
employment and for which awards had been made by the New York Work-
men's Compensation Commission after the filing of the petition in bank-
ruptcy, were held not provable against the employer's estate in bankruptcy
on the ground that such claims "sound in tort." 2 In view of the very gen-
eral statutory provisions requiring some form of employers' insurance for
workmen's compensation risks, the effect of such a decision is considerably
mitigated, and in fact only one instance of a similar claim has been re-
ported.3 But where for some reason the insurance is ineffectual or unavail-
able to the employee, the result of the instant case is as unfortunate as
it is unnecessary.
The liability of an employer under vorkmen's compensation statutes is
generally said to rest on "quasi" or "constructive" contract where the act
is compulsory,4 and, on the theory that the statute "is read into and be-
comes a part of the contract of employment" where the act is elective.5
Accordingly, legislation purporting to change a substantial term of the
statute in force at the time of an injury or a death compensable thereunder
is invalid as impairing the obligation of a contract.0 Similarly, under the
contract theory the authorities are practically uniform in applying the
statute of the forum to foreign injuries arising under domestic contracts
of employment. 7 And in other cases, dealing with the form of verdlet,8 the
computation of interest on awards,9 and the election of remedies,1 o contract
153 F. (2d) 482 (S. D. N. Y. 1931), aff'd, 54 F. (2d) 338 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
A fifth claim based on an award made before the filing of the petition was
disallowed on the ground that an "award has the same status as a verdict."
See infra, note 2. But the analogy to a judgment seems more persuasive. See
Sperduto v. New York City Interborough Ry. Co., 226 N. Y. 73, 76, 123 N. E.
207, 208 (1919). An award is final unless an appeal is taken in the manner
prescribed, 2 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (1922) § 556; and is
enforceable by execution. Roach v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n, 195 S.
W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917).
2 A tort claim is provable if it has been reduced to judgment before the
filing of the petition in bankruptcy, Lewis v. Roberts, 267 U. S. 467, 45
Sup. Ct. 357 (1925) ; or if the tortious act is of such a nature as to author-
ize a waiver of the tort and a recovery in quasi-contract. Clarke v. Rogers,
228 U. S. 534, 33 Sup. Ct. 587 (1913). But not otherwise. Schall v. Camors,
251 U. S. 239, 40 Sub. Ct. 135 (1920). A verdict in a tort case rendered
before the filing of the petition is not provable. In re Ostrom, 185 Fed.
988 (D. Minn. 1911).
3 Matter of Rockaway Soda Water Mfg. Co., 36 A. B. R. 640 (E. D. N. Y.
1916) (claim made by the New York State Industrial Commission).
4 Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 184 Cal. 26, 192
Pac. 1021 (1920) ; of. Cameron v. Ellis Construction Co., 252 N. Y. 394, 169
N. E. 622 (1930) ; see Angell, Recovery Under Workmen' Compensation Aoto
for Injury Abroad (1918) 31 HARV. L. REV. 619, 628-631.
5 See Frasca v. City Coal Co., 97 Conn. 212, 215, 116 Atl. 189, 190 (1922).
In a number of states the Act expressly provides for contractual liability.
See 1 BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION (2d ed. 1914) 48 ot seq.
G Preveslin v. The Derby & Ansonia Developing Co., 112 Conn. 129, 151
Atl. 518 (1930).
7 (1932) 32 COL. L. REv. 131.
8 Kannenberg v. Deere & Mansur Co., 203 Ill. App. 607 (1916).
9 Johnson v. Ismert-Hincke Milling Co., 116 Kan. 731, 229 Pac. 359 (1924)
(interest held to run from the time of the accident).
10 Moeser v. Shunk, 116 Kan. 247, 226 Pac. 784 (1924).
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principles have determined the results. Consequently, in the instant case,
it might be argued that the claims were founded "upon a contract express
or implied" and were accordingly provable under Section 63a (4) of the
Bankruptcy Act."
But even if this theory be rejected, there seems to be no basis for saying
that these claims sound in tort. The Supreme Court dictum2 upon which
the instant court relies, to the effect that the concept of status rather than
contract underlies compensation legislation, clearly lends no support to
such a view. Courts and commentators alike have demonstrated that the
liability created by workmen's compensation acts is in direct conflict vith
the rules as to the ordinary requisites of a tort.13 'Moreover, the New York
Workmen's Compensation Act expressly provides that "compensation shall
have the same preference . . . against the assets of the . . . employer . . .
as is now or may hereafter be allowed by law to the claimant for unpaid
wages," 1 4 and in other states it is provided that claims for unpaid com-
pensation insurance premiums, as well as claims for compensation, "shall
be entitled to the same preference in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings
as is now given by any law of the state or by the Federal Bankruptcy Act
[Section 64b (5) ] to claims for labor." 15 Under such a provision claims
for unpaid insurance premiums have been given the status of labor claims
and priority under Section 64b (7) of the Bankruptcy Act.10 A fortiori,
it would seem that a claim for compensation, which is computed on the
basis of the workman's capacity to earn and is regarded as a substitute
therefor, 7 should be entitled to such a status.' s "
RIGHT OF TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY TO OBTAIN PARTITION OF
BANKRUrT's PROPERTY.
IN the recent case of Lanzgford v. BricleU I the trustee in bankruptcy of a
tenant in common brought suit for partition of certain real property. The
1180 STAT. 562 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 103a (4) (1927).
"2See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418, 423, 44 Sup. Ct.
153, 154 (1923).
13 North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1, 162 Pac. 93 (1916);
Smith, Sequel to WorkmneWs Compensation Acts (1914) 27 HAv. L. REV.
235; Wambaugh, Warknmes Compensation Acts: Their Theory and Ticir
Constitutionality. (1911) 25 HARV. L. Rnv. 129-132.
'-4 CAHILL, CONSoL. LAWS OF NEW YORK (1930) c. 66, § 34. This provision
was held to be ineffective in Matter of Rockaway Soda Water Mfg. Co.,
supra note 3.
The provision quoted is from the Wisconsin Act. Wis. STATUTES (1929)
c. 102, § 28. Other provisions are collected in 2 SCH'NEIDER, Op. cit. sipra
note 1, at § 570.
16 In re Ireland, 4 F. (2d) 813 (S. D. Cal. 1925) ; In re William H. Dea-
son & Co., 19 F. (2d) 275 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927) ; (1931) 71 A. L. II. 1141;
(1928) 54 A. L. R. 567; Note (1923) 32 YALE L. J. 400.
"See Surace v. Dana, 248 N. Y. 18, 20, 161 N. B. 315 (1928) ; 1 HoN-
NOLD, WORKIEN'S COIPENSATION (1918) §§ 147-148.
s An award which had been commuted by the court and on which judg-
ment had been entered was allowed the same priority as a clain for wages
in Brzinski v. Acme Body Co., 37 N. J. L. J. 183 (1914). The same result
has been reached in state insolvency proceedings. Steel & Iron 'Mongers,
Inc. v. Bonnite Insulator Co., 90 N. J. Eq. 200, 106 At. 380 (1919). But
see Matter of Rockaway Soda Water Mfg. Co., supra note 3. The bank-
ruptcy laws of England and Canada give priority to amounts due under
workmen's compensation. 2 HALSBURY'S LAWS OP ENGLAND 215; DUNCAN,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF BANKRUPTCY IN CANADA 457.
'138 So. 75 (Fla. 1931).
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bankruptcy court, which could not take jurisdiction itself,2 had authorized
the proceedings after a finding that partition was necessary to secure a true
salable value for the bankrupt's interest, which if undivided was totally
unacceptable to the realty market. The Florida Supreme Court, however,
denied the suit, holding that partition would only be granted if absolutely
necessary to the bankrupt's creditors, and that the realization of a greater
return for their benefit was not such "necessity" as would warrant the dis-
turbance of the peaceable possession of the other co-tenants. The decision
is reminiscent of the early common law distaste for compulsory partition,a
and may have been influenced by an unwillingness to disturb the long estab-
lished family residence on the property in question apparent from the alle-
gations of the complaint.
From the few cases in which the issue has been presented, the right to
a partition would, clearly appear to be an incident of a trustee's powers.
Although some dicta have doubted that the trustee is such a co-tenant as is
contemplated by the partition statutes,4 more accurate interpretations give
no weight to this objection,5 since a trustee in bankruptcy is generally con-
sidered to hold an absolute title and to take as a purchaser.0 The trustee
has been permitted to sue for a partition even without any order from the
bankruptcy court authorizing him to do so,[ on the ground that his power
to institute suit is derived directly from the Bankruptcy Act.8 The lack of
such an order, however, has been frowned upon, and its procurement would
seem the better practice.9 In one case the ground for dismissing the par-
tition suit was asserted to-be the possibility of conflict between the provi-
sions of the Bankruptcy Act and those of the state partition statute rela-
tive to the manner of sale and the value at which such property might be
disposed of.10 Such a possibility is obviated by the trustee's securing the
bankruptcy court's order, which has been interpreted as a waiver of juris-
diction by that court and consent that the state court might provide for the
disposition of the concurrent estate in accordance with the laws of the jurls-
diction."1
Finally, the right" to partition under state statutes is usually absolute,
and consequently the're is ordinarily no need to allege and prove any neces-
sity.j2 But the Florida court had previously construed 13 that state's parti-
tion statute as granting not an absolute right, but one contingent upon a
showing of necessity, and had dismissed a partition suit which was without
authorization by the bankruptcy court, and was based on the mere allega-
2 30 STAT. 552 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 46 (1926).
Il WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY (6th ed. 1902) § 917.
4 See Hobbs v. Frazier, 56 Fla. 796, '198, 799, 47 So. 929, 930 (1908);
Lindsay v. Runkle, 82 Ohio St. 325, 335, 92 N. E. 489, 490 (1910).
5 Champion v. Spurck, 302 Ill. 241, 134 N. E. 717 (1922); Harlin v.
American Trust Co., 67 Ind. App. 213, 119 N. E. 20 (1918). Prior to the
Bankruptcy Act an assignee in bankruptcy could maintain an action for
partition. Rutherford v. Hewey, 59 How. Pr. 231 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1880); see
Van Arsdale v. Drake, 2 Barb. 599, 600 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1848); of. Jewett
v. Perrette, 127 Ind. 97, 26 N. E. 685 (1891).
6 30 STAT. 565 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 110 (1926); GILBERT'S COLLIEIR ON
BANKRUPTCY (2d ed. 1931) 1144.
7 Harlin v. American Trust Co., supra note 5.
830 STAT. 557 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 75 (1926).
9 GILBERT'S COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 730.
10 Lindsay v. Runkle, supra note 4.
11 Champion v. Spurck, supra note 5.
Harlin v. American Trust Co., s'upra note 5; of. TIEDE XA, REAL Pno0'-
ERTY (4th ed. 1924) § 195.
13 Hobbs v. Frazier, supra note 4.
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tion that the trustee was "desirous of obtaining a partition." The imposi-
tion of the loose "necessary and expedient" prerequisite in that case, how-
ever, hardly justifies the instant decision's rigorous requirement of proof of
absolute necessity.
STATE TAXATION FOR THE RELIEF oF Group DISTRESS
IN an advisory opinion, submitted at the request of the Governor, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota has recently decided that a tax to provide
funds for necessitous stock raisers would not fall within the constitutional
limits of taxation for a public purpose.X In so holding, the court felt that
the weight of authority compelled its adverse decision. But in fact, so far
as precedent was concerned, it would seem that the court was free to decide
as it saw fit.
This type of state relief 2 was classified by the earlier decisions with the
clearly unconstitutional grants of aid to individual enterprises,3 no effect
being given to the special circumstance of group distress. On this basis
legislative authorization of municipal bond issues for loans to inhabitants
for rebuilding fire devastated cities,4 seed grain loans to drought and
storm sufferers,5 and an appropriation for flood relief o were all declared
invalid as involving taxation for a private purpose. The more recent deci-
sions,1 however, have upheld similar measures as a valid extension of the
state's undoubted power to provide relief for the poor,8 arguing that it is
better to prevent a class affected by disaster from becoming paupers than
to withhold aid until complete impoverishment is reachedo Neither rational-
ization is completely satisfactory. By providing state funds for a distressed
class to aid them in carrying on their individual industries, such legislative
programs go far beyond the immediate relief of destitution, and are no
more the traditional "poor relief" than they are aid to privileged private
enterprise. A form of paternalism, sui gcneris, its inclusion in the public
Opinion of the Judges, 6 U. S. Daily, Feb. 13, 1932, at 2820.
2 The validity of federal aid of this type has not been adjudicated, pos-
sibly because of the difficulty of bringing suit. 'Cf. Massachusetts v. Mellon,
262 U. S. 447, 43 Sup. Ct. 597 (1923), where suits by the state of Massa-
chusetts and a federal taxpayer challenging the constitutionality of the
Federal "Maternity Act" were dismissed on the grounds that the state
presented no justiceable controversy either on its own behalf or as the repre-
sentative of its citizens, and that the federal taxpayer had no such inter-
est in the subject matter, nor was any such injury inflicted or threatened, as
would enable her to sue.
3 Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655 (U. S. 1874) ; Allen Y. Inhabi-
tants of Jay, 60 Me. 124 (1372).
4Lowell v. Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873); Feldman & Co. v. Charleston,
23 S. C. 57 (1884).
5 In re Relief Bills, 21 Colo. 62, 39 Pac. 1089 (1895) ; State v. Osawkee
Township, 14 Kan. 418 (1875). But see Beck v. Shawnee, 105 Kan. 325, 329,
330, 182 Pac. 397, 399 (1919). "The legislature has deliberately disregarded
that decision [State v. Osawkee] in two notable instances for the relief of
drought stricken farmers in Kansas [Laws of 1891 c. 42. 129, and c. 199.
Laws of 1895, c. 242]." Treadwell v. Beebe, 107 Kan. 31, 38, 190 Pac. 763,
771 (1920).
OPatty v. Colgan, 97 Cal. 251, 31 Pac. 1133 (1893).
State v. Wienrich, 54 Mont. 390, 170 Pac. 942 (1918), noted in (1918)
16 M ICH. L. R-v. 551; State v. Nelson County, 1 N. D. 88, 45 N. W. 33
1890); of. Deering & Co. v. Peterson, 75 Blinn. 118, 77 N. W. 568 (1398).
8 CooLEY, TAxATiON (4th ed. 1924) § 215.
9 Cf. FAIRCHILD, OUTLINB OF APPLIED SocIOLOGY (1917) 176 et seq.
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purpose category should depend on a recognition and evaluation of its pe-
culiar attributes. Such an approach is indicated in the recent case of Cobb
v. Parnell,0 where a seed grain loan to drought sufferers was upheld. The
court not only used the prevention of pauperism argument, but emphasized
the economic fact that "a considerable number in the state could not suffer
without great hurt to the whole," and consequently considered the proposed
loan a valid exercise of the police power for the preservation of the safety
of the state.'1 As intimated by the instant decision, the entire controversy
could be avoided by an express constitutional amendment, declarative of
the public purpose character of taxation for such relief, and when feasible
this would seem the most adequate solution.J2
FEDERAL REGULATION or TICKET BROKERS
A FEDERAL statute provides that when theatre tickets are sold away from
the ticket office the amount of any advance of not more than 75 cents over
the established price shall be taxed at the rate of 51, but if the advance be
more than 75 cents, the total amount of the excess shall be taxed at the
rate of 50%.j The plaintiff, a ticket broker, paid the tax, part of which
was at the 5% rate but the larger amount at the 50% rate, and then sued
for a refund of the entire sum, contending that the act was unconstitu-
tional in that the rates were arbitrary and discriminatory and that its pur-
pose was to regulate the price at which tickets might be sold. Although
conceding that the incidental effect of the tax was to delimit a price range
within which tickets could not profitably be sold, and thus to limit the plain-
tiff's profits to that extent, the Court of Claims, in A. Couthoui, Inc. V.
United States,2 nevertheless held that the statute was a valid revenue meas-
ure, the policy of which was beyond the province of the courts.
The amount of the tax actually paid in the instant case on advances in
excess of 75 cents 3 would tend to indicate that the 50% rate provision was
not totally ineffective as a revenue measure. But that it was more than
that can hardly be denied. It will not be supposed that Congress, had it
been desirous solely of tapping a source of revenue, would have amended
a former statute to increase the limit of the low rate class from 50 cents to
75 cents,4 nor in fact that it would have preferred this dual classification,
with only the crudest relation to profits, to a tax based on progressive
rates. Yet, although the measure was unquestionably designed to regulate
ticket brokers, it is not necessarily objectionable for that reason. In the
10 183 Ark. 429, 36 S. AV. (2d). 388 (1931). But compare the statement of
the court: "The doctrine announced in this case has no application except
in cases where the calamity is certain and irremediable in its nature and
general in its scope." Ibid. at 445, 36 S. W. (2d) at 394.
11 Cf. State v. Davidson, 114 Wis. 563, 90 N. V. 1067 (1902) (immediate
relief of disaster by clearing debris, burying the dead, and relieving the
helpless, a valid exercise of police power by state); GRAY, LIMITATIONS Or
TAXING POWER (1906) § 322; MINN. GEN. STAT. (1878) 1026 (bond issue to
provide aid for sufferers from grasshopper plague).
12 Cf. COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 216.
145 STAT. 863, 864 (1928), 26 U. S. C. § 871 (1928), amending a similar
act passed in 1926, the only substantial change being the substitution of
75 cents for 50 cents as a demarcation between high and low rates.
2 54 F. (2d) 158 (Ct. Cl. 1931).
3 The amount of the tax paid under the 50% rate was approximately
$120,000 as compared with approximately $40,000 under the 5% rate.
4 See note 1 supra.
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early case of Veazie Bank v. Fenno 5 the constitutionality of a tax admit-
edly designed to drive state bank notes out of circulation was upheld, and
the principle there laid down that the judiciary cannot prescribe limits to
the exercise of legislative powers was subsequently relied on to sustain regu-
latory taxes on immigrationp narcotics,' and artificially colored oleomarga-
rine.S If it be assumed that the Supreme Court will draw the line where the
tax statute includes detailed provisions for supervisory regulation, the
statute in the instant case is still free from constitutional objection. 2 It
seems likely, therefore, that the federal government is here successfully regu-
lating a business which is predominantly local in its nature and conse-
quences, yet which previously had been held immune to direct legislative
control by the state because it was not affected with a public interest.21
DouBLE LImAiry ON ImRGULARLY IssLTED BANK STOCK.
IN the case of Randall v. 11ficke 1 a bank, whose charter provided for no
increase in capital stock, nevertheless issued such an increase without stat-
utory authority. Upon the bank's subsequent insolvency the court held that
a subscriber to the stock of the new issue was not subject to double liability
thereon.
If a court can find that a stock issue has been effected without the "ab-
stract power" of the bank,2 as where the issue is in excess of the limits im-
posed by the corporate charter,3 or where the bank was never legally in-
corporated because the capital stock was not fully paid in,4 no double lia-
bility attaches. Since in suchca case the subscriber receives no rights, logi-
cally he can be subject to no duties with regard to the stock. If, on the
other hand, the bank has power to issue the stock, the fact that it is issued
8 Wall. 533, 548 (U. S. 1869); see Pacific Insurance Co. v. Soule, 7
Wall. 433, 443 (U .S. (1868).
Gr Head Money Cases, 112 U. S. 580, 5 Sup. Ct. 247 (1384). The act [22
STAT. 214 (1882)] levied a tax of 50 cents on each passenger not a citizen
of the United States.
7 United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86, :39 Sup. Ct. 214 (1919) (4
judges dissenting). See Nigro v. United States, 276 U. S. 332, 341, 48
Sup. Ct. 388, 390 (1927); Alston v. United States, 274 U. S. 289, 294, 47
Sup. Ci 634, 635 (1926). A statute levying a two cent tax on each hundred
white sulphurous matches and providing for registration of the manufac-
turers with the collector of Internal Revenue has never been questioned. 37
STAT. 81 (1912), 26 U. S. C. § 663 (1928).
s McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27, 24 Sup. Ct. 769 (1904). See In
Re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526, 536, 17 Sup. Ct. 444, 447 (1897).
9 Cf. Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 42 Sup. Ct. 449 (1922); Hill v.
Wallace, 259 U. S. 44, 42 Sup. Ct. 453 (1922) (future grain dealings).
10 Cf. Alexander Theatre Ticket Office v. United States, 23 F. (2d) 44
(C. C. A. 2d) (1927), involving the 1926 federal tax on theater ticket brokers.
2 "Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927). See Comment
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 985.
1138 So. 14 (Fla. 1931).
2 See Latimer v. Bard, 76 Fed. 536, 542 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1896). Or it
could be labeled "ultra vires."
3 Kampman v. Tarver, 87 Tex. 491, 29 S. W. 768 (1895); cf. Scovill v.
Thayer, 105 U. S. 143 (1881). For general discussion of the double lia-
bility of bank stockholders, see Comment (1932) 41 YA= L. J. 583.
4 Shaw v. Kopecky, 27 S. W. (2d) 275 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930); cf. Furr v.
Chapman, 286 S. W. 171 (Tex. Comm. App. 1926), rehearing denied, 287
S. W. 496 (1926).
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without the requisite consent of the stockholders,' or in some other irregular
manner, is no defense to double liability.6 And where the bank violates the
statutory provision 7 designed to prevent stock watering and requiring full
payment of the entire issue to validate the increase, paid-up subscriptions
may be rendered subject to double liability by a subsequent reduction of
theproposed increase to the amount actually paid in, although the sub-
scriber had no knowledge of the reduction,8 or it was made against his
protest after insolvency and suspension of the bdnk.' Even if such a re-
duction were not made, so far as it affects double liability the subscriber's
power to rescind would be terminated by the bank's insolvency.1o And if the
subscriber has not validly paid all of his subscription price, he is estopped
to challenge the validity of the transaction on that score. 1 In all such
cases the law of the state of incorporation of state banks determines the
stockholders' liability 12 and the burden of proof is on the alleged stock-
holder to show that he is not actually a holder.13 Although the distinction
adopted in the instant case thus appears to be generally accepted, it may
be permissible nevertheless to question its soundness. As regards creditors,
the subscribers, who have access to the bank books, should be required to
ascertain the validity of the issue. The creditors themselves rely upon the
apparent capital stock, irrespective of the mode of its issuance. Therefore,
negligence in accepting invalid stock, laches in failing to avoid the sub-
scription, acceptance of benefits under it and the intervening rights of
innocent third parties who rely upon the apparent capital stock should be
sufficient to estop the subscriber from asserting the invalidity of the issue
to avoid double liability.
'Commissioner of Banks v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 253 Mass. 205, 148
N. E. 609 (1925) ; cf. State v. Hardister, 108 Okla. 64, 237 Pac. 75 (1924).
But that an illegal increase in capital stock was made without the stock-
holder's consent does not relieve him of liability for an assessment upon
stock owned by him before such increase. Crowley v. Chapman, 260 S. W.
231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924).
Chubb v. Upton, 95 U. S. 665 (1877); Cunningham v. Commissioner of
Banks, 249 Mass. 401, 144 N. E. 447 (1924) ; Rogers & Lyon v. Cozart, 192
N. C. 720, 135 S. E. 864 (1926); see Winters v. Armstrong, 7 Fed. 508,
513 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1889).
7 In the case of national banks, for instance, the pre-requisites for a valid
increase of capital stock are (1) approval of the "owvners of two-thirds of
the stock, (2) a certificate of approval from the comptroller, and (3) pay-
ment of the entire amount of the increase. 13 STAT. 103, 24 STAT. 18, as
amended in 44 STAT. 1227, 12 U. S. C. (1926), with pocket part (1927) §§
57, 58. It has been held that double liability cannot be imposed where the
comptroller failed to approve the increase. McFarlin v. First National Bank
of Kansas City, 68 Fed. 868 (C. C. A. 8th, 1895). This, it seems, would
generally be considered a mere irregularity.
8 Pacific National Bank v. Eaton, 141 U. S. 227, 11 Sup. Ct, 984 (1891);
Bailey v. Tillinghast, 99 Fed. 801 (C. C. A. 6th, 1900). Requirements ap-
plicable to an increase in capital stock must be met in case of sucl reduc-
tion. Schierenberg v. Stephens, 32 Mo. App. 314 (1888).
0 Aspinwall v. Butler, 133 U. S. 595, 10 Sup. Ct. 417 (1890).
10 Scott v. Deweese, 181 U. S. 202, 21 Sup. Ct. 585 (1901).
11 George Irish Paper Corporation v. White, 91 Misc. 261, 154 N. Y. Supp.
778 (Sup. Ct. 1915) ; cf. Taylor v. Gordon, 180 Ark. 753, 22 S. W. (2d), 561
(1929) ; Thompson v. Fnrst State Bank of Amarillo, 109 Tex. 419, 211 S. W.
977 (1919); Willis v. First National Bank of Littlefield, 22 S. W. (2d) 471
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
12 Baird v. Cole, 207 Iowa 664, 223 N. W. 514 (1929).
13 See Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U. S. 536, 550, 551, 21 Sup. Ct. 878, 883
(1901).
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INCORPORATION STATUTra AS BASIS or CLASSIFICATION FOR FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION
THE federal government attempted to levy a general corporation taxI upon
two companies incorporated under the section of the New York Insurance
Law pertaining to title and credit guaranty companies and subject to the
supervision of the state insurance department. The business of one con-
sisted of insuring titles to real estate and making loans secured by first
mortgages. These mortgages were later sold to the public, accompanied by
the seller's guaranty, by the terms of which it promised to pay the principal
when due and a stipulated rate of interest, usually 24 of 15 less than that
paid to it by the mortgagor. This difference was retained by the company
as a premium for its guaranty. The purchaser appointed the company as
his agent to collect interest and principal. Similar transactions constituted
the business of the other company but it issued no policies of title insurance.
Both companies were held to come within the category of insurance com-
panies and thus entitled to the special tax provided by Section 246 of the
Revenue Act of 1921 3 in lieu of the general corporation tax.4
In holding that the classification given a business by the state under
whose laws it was organized should "turn the scales," the court relied on a
decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Cambridge
Loan & Building Association,5 where a company incorporated by the state
as a building and loan association was held entitled to that classification
for federal tax purposes despite the fact that a large proportion of its
business was carried on with non-memberso The applicability of this deci-
sion in the instant cases is questionable, however, in view of the fact that
the statute involved therein expressly qualified the classification of building
and loan associations by the word "domestic," a fact which was deemed
to indicate an intention to accept the state classification. Moreover, in an
earlier case the same court refused to accept the state classification, and
similarly, state courts have rejected another jurisdiction's classification of a
particular organization.8 That state incorporation laws may be of slight
evidentiary value for purposes of federal taxation is illustrated by a recent
amendment to the New York Insurance Law D permitting the organization
under its provisions of companies to buy and sell mortgages "with or with-
IRrvNuE AcT 1921, § 1000, 42 STAT. 294.
*New York Laws 1892, c. 690, art. 5.
*42 STAT. 262 (1921).
*Home Title Insurance Co. v. United States, 50 F. (2d) 107 (C. C. A.
2d, 1931), rev'g 41 F. (2d) 793 (E. D. N. Y. 1930); Lawyers' Mortgage
Co. v. Bowers, 50 F. (2d) 104 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), affg 34 F. (2d) 504
(S. D. N. Y. 1929). In the latter case writ of certiorari has been granted
by the Supreme Court. U. S. Daily, Feb. 9, 1932, at 2782.
278 U. S. 55, 49 Sup. Ct. 39 (1928).
s Accord: The Calvert Mortgage Co. v. United States, 64 CL CI. 2G1
(1927); South Euclid Savings Bank v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
14 1. T. A. 1079 (1929). Contra: Lilley Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Miller, 280
Fed. 143 (S. D. Ohio 1922), aff'd, 285 Fed. 1020 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923).
7 Hecht v. Malley, 265 U. S. 144, 44 Sup. Ct. 462 (1924) ; cf. Burk & Wag-
goner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110, 46 Sup. Ct. 48 (1925). But see
Eliot v. Freeman, 220 U. S. 178, 31 Sup. Ct. 360 (1911).
8 Oliver v. Liverpool Insurance Co., 100 Mass. 531 (1868), aj'd, 10 Wall.
566 (U. S. 1870); Fargo v. Powers, 220 Fed. 697 (E. D. Mich. 1914); Tide
Water Pipe Co. v. Assessors, 57 N. J. L. 516, 31 Atl. 220 (1895).
9New York Ins. Law, art. 5 (Laws 1929, c. 290, § 1). Prior statutes did
not permit the purchase and sale of mortgages unaccompanied by either
mortgage or title guaranty. See N. Y. Laws, snpra note 2; Opinions of the
Attorney-General (1910) 882, 883.
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out guaranty," a phrase which includes businesses entirely devoid of Insur-
ance features.
Conceding, however, that some weight should be attached to the New
York classification, it is well settled that a taxpayer must strictly prove
his right to an exemption 10 or to inclusion within a special taxing provi-
sion," and further, that the assessments made by an official acting within
his jurisdiction are prima facie valid and correct.' 2 Although the guaranty
of mortgage loans in return for a premium is clearly insurance, closely
analogous to credit guaranty, 3 yet both companies derived much of their
income from non-insurance features, one realizing half of its income for
the taxable years in question (including its income from investments) from
lending and extension fees paid by the mortgagor, none of which covered
title insurance. Moreover, substantially every guaranty was merely an
incident of a mortgage loan, sale, and collection-agency transaction. In
view, therefore, of the proportion of these types of transactions to the total
business of the companies, it may be doubted whether they should be en-
titled to the federal tax privileges granted to insurance companies."4
PETITION BY CREDITOR WHOE CLAIM AROSE AFTER ACT OF BANKRUPTCY
IN the case of In re Western Gear Company 2 an alleged bankrupt moved
to dismiss a petition filed against it on the ground that the petitioner had
not been a creditor at the time of the commission of the act of bankruptcy.
Unable, however, to find any provision in the Bankruptcy Act 2 thus quali-
fying the right of creditors to file petitions, the court denied the motion and
held that the petitioner was entitled to bring the action by reason of the
fact alone that it was a creditor at the time of the filing of the petition.
It has been contended that, even conceding that the Act itself would not
preclude such a right, a literal interpretation of it should nevertheless be
,limited by the "familiar principle that no one ought to complain of that
which does not injure him." 3 The argument is based on an analogy between
a petition in bankruptcy and a creditor's bill to set aside fraudulent con-
veyances.4 Since the latter is maintainable only by one directly injured by
the fraudulent conveyance, a petitioner therein must have been a creditor
10 Bank of Commerce v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 134, 16 Sup. Ct. 456 (1896)
Insurance & Title Guarantee Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 36
F. (2d) 842 (C. C. A. 2d, 1929); Parrott v. Commissioner of Internal Reve-
nue, 30 F. (2d) 792 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929), cert. den., 279 U. S. 870, 49 Sup.
Ct. 512 (1929).
"Nelson v. St. Paul Title Insurance & Trust Co., 64 Minn. 101, 66 X. W.
206 (1896).
12 Germantown Trust Co. v. Lederer, 263 Fed. 672 (C. C. A. 3d, 1920);
The Cordon v. United States, 46 F. (2d) 719 (Ct. of Cls. 1931).
13 See People v. Potts, 264 Ill. 522, 528, 106 N. E. 524, 527 (1914) ci.
FROST, GUARANTY INSURANCE (2d ed. 1909) § 221.
14 Cf. Louisville Title Co. v. Lucas, 27 F. (2d) 413 (W. D. Ky. 1928);
Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. United States, 49 F. (2d) 641 (S. D. Cal,
1931).
'53 F. (2d) 644 (E. D Mich., 1931).
2 Cf. 30 STAT. 544, 561 (1898), 11 U. S. §§ 1 (g), 95 (b) (1926).
3 In re Burck, Fed. Cas. No. 2156 (D. Ore. 1868); see In re Muller, Fed.
Cas. No. 9912, at 974 (D. Ore. 1869).
4 In re Callison, 130 Fed. 987 (S. D. Fla. 1903), aff'd sub. nor, Brake v.
Callisoil, 129 Fed. 201 (C. C. A. 5th, 1904), cort. dn., 194 U. S. 686, 24
Sup. Ct. 858 (1904).
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at the time the fraudulent conveyance was made.3 And a number of -courts
have applied the same test to creditors petitioning for bankruptcy.. The
authority of these cases, however, is considerably weakened by the fact
that the petitioners in each instance were seeking to establish a fraudulent
conveyance by the debtor at a time when there were no other creditors than
the grantee in the conveyance. Manifestly under these circumstances there
could be no fraudulent intent, nor could the conveyance constitute an act of
bankruptcy. Moreover, while the language in these cases would seem to
demand that the petitioner "own" his claim at the date of the alleged act
of bankruptcy, subsequent decisions havd added a modification to the ex-
tent of qualifying a creditor to whom had been transferred after the act a
claim "in edstence" prior to that event.7 Finally any analogy between a
petition in bankruptcy and a creditor's bill to set aside fraudulent convey-
ances appears faulty when applied to those situations in which the acts of
bankruptcy complained of have no relation to the giving of preferences or
the transfer or concealment of the debtor's assets.8 While the object of a
creditor's bill is to indemnify only those creditors -who succeed in discover-
ing and annulling a fraudulent conveyance, the petitioning creditor in banh-
ruptcy obtains no greater advantage than any other creditor whose claim
may be allowed. 9 Therefore the literal interpretation of the Bankruptcy
Act, adopted in the only -previous holdings on the precise point 20 and en-
dorsed in the principal case, would seem a desirable one.
;Horbach v. Hill, 112 U. S. 144, 5 Sup. Ct. 81 (1884). As to what type of
creditor is entitled to attack a fraudulent conveyance, see Marcus v. Kane,
18 F. (2d) 722 (C. C. A. 2d, 1927).
s Beers v. Hanlin, 99 Fed. 695 (D. Ore. 1900) ; In re Brinckman, 103 Fed.
65 (D. Ind. 1900) ; In re Burck, In re Muller, both supra note 3; see In re
Farthing, 202 Fed. 557, 564 (E. D. N. C. 1913). In England the leading
case of Ex parte Charles, 14 East 197, 16 Ves. 256 (1811), first announced
the requirement that the petitioner's debt must be available at the time of
the act of bankruptcy. Under statutes equally as ambiguous as the Amer-
ican Bankruptcy Act, this decision has been followed as "the common law
of bankruptcy." Ex parte Hayward & Jones, 40 L. J. Bk. 49, 24 L. T. R.
782 (1871) ; In re Debtors, 96 L. J. Ch. 33, (1927) 1 Ch. 19.
,In re Perry & Whitney Company, 172 Fed. 745 (D. Mlass. 1909), aff'd
sub. nom. Stroheim v. Perry & Whitney Company, 175 Fed. 52 (C. C. A.
1st, 1910) ; In re Stone, 206 Fed. 356 (E. D. Pa. 1913) ; In re Page Motor Car
Company, 251 Fed. 318 (D. Mass. 1918).
8 In re Van Horn, 246 Fed. 822 (C. C. A. 3d, 1927); BLACK, BANKRUPrCY
(2d ed. 1914) § 153; cf. 30 STAT. 546 (1898), 11 U. S. C. § 21 (a) (1926).
9 In re Hanvan, 180 Fed. 498 (S. D. N. Y. 1910).
10 Ibid.; In re Van Horn, supra note 8. For situations involving the assign-
ment of claims after the petition is filed, see Emerine v. Tarault, 219 Fed. 68
(C. C. A. 6th, 1915) ; In re Kehoe, 233 Fed. 415 (C. C. A. 2d, 1916). That the
claim must at least be in edstence at the time of the filing of the petition, see
Missouri Valley Cattle Loan Company v. Alexander, 276 Fed. 266 (C. C. A.
8th, 1921) ; of. In re Eads, 17 F. (2d) 813 (W. D. Wash. 1926).
